| UPDATE:
DECEMBER 19, 2003
Just in time for Christmas, we are pleased
to offer a final update to the philosophy section: four new essays
on the philosophical questions raised by the Matrix films.
Starting things off is Tim Mawson’s essay “Morpheus
and Berkeley
on Reality”. Tim is Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at St Peter’s
College, Oxford University. He takes a comment by Morpheus regarding “what
is real” as his starting point for an introduction to the difficult philosophical
problem of sorting out the real from the unreal. Discussing the philosopher George
Berkeley’s startling views on the nature of reality, he considers the question
of whether Berkeley offers a genuine, if radical, way out of the skeptical worries
raised by Descartes, and whether this Berkeleyan path is one that Morpheus would
do best to follow. He concludes that, even if Berkeley doesn’t offer us
a satisfying escape from skepticism, consideration of his views can help us to
get closer to the truth through bringing us to a more sophisticated understanding
of Morpheus’s comments and the skeptical worries they engender.
Next is "Matrix and Monadology",
an essay from the Johns Hopkins philosopher Sean
Greenberg that compares the metaphysical implications of the Matrix
with the bizarre metaphysics of the 17th century philosopher Gottfried Leibniz.
Pointing
out
some
revealing
similarities
between Leibniz's "Monadology" and the world described in The Matrix,
Greenberg goes on to use the film to help elucidate Leibniz's notion of "monads" and
his theory
of
causation.
While both The Matrix and Leibniz seem to present us with nightmarish
visions
of
reality as being thoroughly unlike what we ordinarily believe, Greenberg
concludes that it is only the film that presents a genuine nightmare, and that
a proper understanding of Leibniz's views can help us understand why the metaphysics
of
the Matrix is so disturbing.
Richard Hanley, the philosopher from the University of Delaware
who previously contributed
an essay on the similarities between The Matrix and heaven ("Never
the Twain Shall Meet: Reflections on The First Matrix"), here brings
us a spirited discussion of the philosophy of Jean Baudrillard, one of the few
philosophers
to be explicitly referenced in the first Matrix film. In his essay "Simulacra
and Simulation", Hanley considers Baudrillard's influence on The
Matrix as well as the general influence that Baudrillard's brand of postmodernism
has had on our culture. Along the way he offers readers a critical but enlightening
introduction
to postmodern thought.
Finally we have "The Twisted
Matrix: Dream, Simulation, or Hybrid?" from the influential philosopher
and cognitive
scientist Andy Clark. Clark brings some helpful empirical data
to the
table to help ground the discussion of the "dreamlike quality" of the
Matrix that we have seen in essays from Grau, McGinn, Chalmers, and others. Pointing
out that the reality of dreams is rather different than philosophers tend to
suppose,
he distinguishes between the sloppy but creative cognition of our actual "uncritical" dreams
and
the "industrial strength deception" that philosophers since Descartes
have (mistakenly) assumed to be part and parcel of ordinary dreams. Arguing
that the film plays on and at times conflates these two distinct conceptions
of dreams, Clark concludes that this ambivalence
at
the
heart
of The Matrix helps explain why it is such a memorable and thought-provoking
cinematic experience.
Chris Grau, Editor
_____________________________________
UPDATE:
MARCH 20, 2003
As promised, we are pleased to offer five new essays tackling philosophical
themes that arise in The Matrix.
Starting things off is a piece by the epistemologist and philosopher
of mind James
Pryor. He's contributed a lively essay that will be of particular interest to those coming to philosophy for
the first time. In "What's
So Bad About Living in The Matrix?" he explores and criticizes
two tempting but problematic philosophical positions: the view that
there can't be facts which it's impossible for us to know about (sometimes
called verificationism), and the view that everyone's motive for
acting
is always to have nicer experiences. Employing examples from both
the film and imaginary thought-experiments, Pryor tries to show that
these
positions, which can often initially seem irresistible to students,
are not as straightforward or as satisfying as they might first appear.
He then goes on to argue (in sympathy with Vasiliou’s essay) that
the worst thing about living in the Matrix would not be the metaphysical
or epistemological limitations such a scenario would impose, it would
instead be the political constraints: those trapped in the Matrix have
constraints on their action that most of us deeply value not having.
David Chalmers is a philosopher from the University
of Arizona and author of numerous books and articles on the philosophy
of mind, including the influential volume The Conscious Mind.
In his essay "The
Matrix as Metaphysics," he suggests that while we cannot
rule out the possibility that we are in a system like the Matrix,
this possibility
is not as bad as we might have thought. He argues against the intuitive
view that if we are in a matrix, we are deluded about the external
world.
Instead, he suggests that if we are in a matrix, we should regard
this as telling us about the nature of the external world: the physical
world
is ultimately made of bits, and was created by beings who ensured
that our minds interact with this physical world. Chalmers's surprising
conclusion
is that even if we are living in a Matrix-like simulation, most of
our beliefs about the world are still true.
Julia Driver, a moral philosopher from Dartmouth
College and author of Uneasy Virtue, explores some of the
distinctively ethical issues that arise in The Matrix in
her essay "Artificial
Ethics." Driver begins by using the film to consider the
moral status of artificially created beings: she argues that, given
certain
assumptions regarding the nature of consciousness, rationality, and
personhood, we ought to regard artificial intelligences such as Agent
Smith as creatures that deserve genuine moral consideration. In the
second part of her essay Driver tackles the thorny philosophical
question
of whether one can behave immorally when in “non-veridical”
(illusory) circumstances. Noting the implausibility of attributing wrongdoing
to those who perform seemingly immoral acts in a dream, she argues that,
to the extent that the Matrix offers a similarly illusory world free
of actual unpleasant effects on others, it also seems odd to attribute
wrongdoing to agents acting in such a world. However, drawing on insights
from the first part of her essay, Driver concludes that we have good
reasons to think that actions in the Matrix would have genuine
effects on both humans and some artificial creatures, and thus the
world
of the Matrix, like our world, has its own moral norms — its own
ethics — that ought to be both acknowledged and respected.
Michael McKenna, a philosopher at Ithaca College
who specializes in the philosophical problems of freedom and moral
responsibility,
offers up a comprehensive yet light-hearted exploration of the free
will problem in his essay "Neo's
Freedom ... Whoa!".
Ingeniously utilizing aspects of The Matrix to describe and
explore the traditional positions taken in debates over free will, McKenna
manages to cover a lot of ground: determinism, fatalism, compatibilism,
and incompatibilism are all canvassed and compared through the unique
perspective afforded us by the film. He then goes on to explore the
attractiveness of the radical freedom that Neo appears to have achieved
by the end of The Matrix. Does such absolute freedom indeed
“rock” the way we naturally think it would? McKenna convincingly
argues that total freedom of this sort offers too much of a good thing:
part of the joy we take in exercising our freedom is in pushing boundaries
and testing limits — if all boundaries and limitations are removed,
the possibility for such joy will disappear as well.
Finally, we have an essay from John Partridge, a professor
of philosophy at Wheaton College whose work focuses on the philosophy
of the ancient Greeks. In "Plato's
Cave & The Matrix," Partridge considers the striking
similarities between The Matrix and the "cave" scenario
described in Plato’s Republic. In addition to pointing
out the numerous surface parallels between the cave-dwellers Plato describes
and the humans trapped in the Matrix, Partridge explores a deeper continuity
between the film and Plato’s text: both narratives privilege the
self-knowledge that follows from the right kind of self-examination.
As Plato might put it, both Neo and the cave-dwellers must undertake
a difficult journey from darkness to light if genuine knowledge (and
consequently true "care of the soul") is to be attained.
Enjoy this new group of essays, and be sure and check back soon for
further updates.
Chris Grau,
Editor
_____________________________________
LAUNCH:
NOVEMBER 20, 2002
The Matrix
is a film that astounds not only with action and special effects but
also with ideas. These pages are dedicated to exploring some of the
many philosophical ideas that arise in both the original film and the
sequels. In the upcoming months we will be continually expanding this
section, offering essays from some of the brightest minds in philosophy
and cognitive science. We are kicking things
off with essays from eight different contributors on various philosophical,
technological, and religious aspects of the film.
Though this collection of essays is part of the official web site for
the Matrix films, the views expressed in these essays are solely
those of the individual authors. The Wachowski brothers have remained
relatively tight-lipped regarding the religious symbolism and philosophical
themes that permeate the film, preferring that the movie speak for itself.
Accordingly, you will not find anyone here claiming to offer the
definitive analysis of the film, its symbols, message, etc. What you
will find instead are essays that both elucidate the philosophical problems
raised by the film and explore possible avenues for solving these problems.
Some of these essays are more pedagogical in nature instructing
the reader in the various ways in which The Matrix raises questions
that have been tackled throughout history by prominent philosophers.
Other contributors use the film as a springboard for discussing their
own original philosophical views. As you will see, the authors
don't always agree with each other regarding how best to interpret the
film. However, all of the essays share the aim of giving the reader
a sense of how this remarkable film offers more than the standard Hollywood
fare. In other words, their common goal is to help show you just "how
deep the rabbit-hole goes."
Beginning the collection are three short essays in which I discuss two
of the more conspicuous philosophical questions raised by the film:
the skeptical worry that ones experience may be illusory, and
the moral question of whether it matters. Highlighting the parallels
between the scenario described in The Matrix and similar imaginary
situations that have been much discussed by philosophers, these essays
offer an introduction to the positions taken by various thinkers on
these fascinating skeptical and moral puzzles. They serve as a warm-up
for things to come.
Next is "The Matrix
of Dreams" by Colin McGinn, a distinguished contemporary
philosopher who is perhaps best known for his writings on consciousness.
His essay offers an analysis of the film that focuses on the dreamlike
nature of the world of the Matrix. Arguing that it is misguided to
characterize
the situation described by the film as involving hallucinations, McGinn
seeks to show how the particular details of the film make it more
plausible
to see the Matrix as involving the direct employment of ones imagination
(as in a dream), rather than a force-feeding of false perceptions.
Along the way, McGinns essay also touches on the moral assumptions
of the film, several other philosophical problems raised by the character
of Cypher, and the dreamlike quality of all films.
Hubert Dreyfus is a philosopher known both for his pioneering
discussion of the philosophical problems of Artificial Intelligence,
and his work in bridging the gap between recent European and English-language
philosophy. In "The
Brave New World of The Matrix," he and his son Stephen
Dreyfus draw on the phenomenological tradition that began with Edmund
Husserl and culminates in Maurice Merleau-Ponty to discuss the skeptical
and moral problems raised by the film. They argue that the real worry
facing folks trapped in the Matrix involves not deception or the possession
of possibly false beliefs, but the limits on creativity imposed by the
Matrix. Following Martin Heidegger in suggesting that our human nature
lies in our capacity to redefine our nature and thereby open up new
worlds, they conclude that this capacity for radical creation seems
unavailable to those locked within the pre-programmed confines of the
Matrix.
Richard Hanley, author of the best-selling book The Metaphysics
of Star Trek and a philosophy professor at the University of Delaware,
again explores the intersection of philosophy and science fiction with
his entertaining and thought-provoking piece "Never
the Twain Shall Meet: Reflections on The First Matrix." In
it he argues that The Matrix may have lessons to teach us regarding
the coherence of our values. In particular, he makes the case that,
given a traditional Christian notion of an afterlife, Heaven turns out
to be rather like a Matrix! Even more surprising is a corollary to this
thesis: Jean-Paul ("Hell is other people") Sartre was close
to the truth after all Heaven is best understood as a Matrix-like
simulation in which contact with other real human beings is eliminated.
Iakovos Vasiliou, a philosopher at Brooklyn College who specializes
in Plato, Aristotle, and Wittgenstein, offers a penetrating investigation
into the differences (and surprising similarities) between the scenario
described in The Matrix and our own everyday situation in his
essay "Reality, What Matters,
and
The Matrix." Pointing out that more than we might expect
hinges on the moral backdrop of The Matrix plot line, he asks
readers to instead envisage a "benevolently generated Matrix."
Given the possibility of such a Matrix and the actuality of a horrible
situation on Earth, he argues that we will agree that entering into
it offers not a denial of what we most value but instead a chance to
better realize those values.
Changing gears a bit we then have an essay from the notable (and some
would say notorious) cybernetics pioneer Kevin Warwick. He is
known internationally for his robotics research and in particular for
a series of procedures in which he was implanted with sensors that connected
him to computers and the internet. Less well-publicized is the fact
that several years before The Matrix came out he published a
non-fiction book that predicted the ultimate takeover of mankind by
a race of super-intelligent robots. In his contribution here ("The
Matrix Our Future?")
he draws on his years of research to muse on the plausibility (and desirability)
of the scenario described in The Matrix, concluding that a real-life
Matrix need not be feared if we prepare ourselves adequately. How? By
becoming part machine ourselves Warwick argues that transforming
ourselves into Cyborgs will allow us to "plug in" confident
that we will fully benefit from all that such a future offers.
Rounding out our collection is an essay entitled "Wake
Up! Gnosticism & Buddhism in The Matrix" from two
professors of religion: Frances Flannery-Dailey and Rachel
Wagner. Flannery-Dailey's research speciality is ancient dreams,
apocalypticism and early-Jewish mysticism, while Wagner's research focuses
on biblical studies and the relationship between religion & culture.
Their essay offers a comprehensive treatment of the Gnostic and Buddhist
themes that appear in the film. While pointing out the many differences
between these two traditions and the eclectic manner in which both are
referenced throughout the film, Flannery-Dailey and Wagner make it clear
that common to Gnosticism, Buddhism, and The Matrix is the idea
that what we take to be reality is in fact a kind of illusion or dream
from which we ought best to "wake up." Only then can enlightenment,
be it spiritual or otherwise, occur.
We hope you enjoy this first batch of essays. Check back for future
contributions from the renowned philosopher of mind David Chalmers
(Arizona), moral philosopher Julia Driver (Dartmouth), and epistemologist
James Pryor (Princeton), among others.
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